The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays on the proposed new U.S. Constitution and on the nature of republican government, published in 1787-88 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Their intent was to persuade New York state voters to support ratification.
Seventy-seven of the essays first appeared serially in New York newspapers, were reprinted in most other states, and were published in book form on May 28, 1788; the remaining eight papers appeared in New York newspapers between June 14 and August 16.
All the papers appeared over the signature "Publius," and the authorship of some of the papers was once a matter of scholarly dispute. However, modern computer analysis, added to existing historical evidence, has caused almost all historians to agree that the authorship is the following: Hamilton wrote numbers 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-36, 59-61, and 65-85; Madison numbers 10, 14, 18-20, 37-58, and 62-63; and Jay numbers 2-5 and 64. (Source: Encyclopedia Britannica .)
All 85 essays are readable individually through the links below.
The Federalist Papers
General Introduction (Hamilton)Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay)Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, continued (Jay)Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, continued (Jay)Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, continued (Jay)Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (Hamilton)Dangers from Dissensions Between the States, continued (Hamilton)The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States (Hamilton)The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Hamilton)The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, continued (Hamilton)The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy (Hamilton)The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue (Hamilton)Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government (Hamilton)Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered (Madison)The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton)The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, continued (Hamilton)The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, continued (Hamilton)The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, continued (Madison, with Hamilton)The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, continued (Madison, with Hamilton)The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, continued (Madison, with Hamilton)Other Defects of the Present Confederation (Hamilton)Other Defects of the Present Confederation, continued (Hamilton)The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union (Hamilton)The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (Hamilton)The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered, continued (Hamilton)The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (Hamilton)The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered, continued (Hamilton)The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered, continued (Hamilton)The Militia (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation, continued (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation, continued (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation, continued (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation, continued (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation, continued (Hamilton)The General Power of Taxation, continued (Hamilton)The Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government (Madison)The Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government, continued (Madison)The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles (Madison)The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained (Madison)General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution (Madison)Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (Madison)Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered, continued (Madison)Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States (Madison)The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered (Madison)The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared (Madison)The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts (Madison)These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other (Madison)Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention (Madison)Periodical Appeals to the People Considered (Madison)The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (Madison)The House of Representatives (Madison)The House of Representatives, continued (Madison)The Apportionment of Members Among the States (Madison)The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Madison)The Total Number of the House of Representatives, continued (Madison)The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation (Madison)Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered (Madison)The Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Hamilton)The Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members, continued (Hamilton)The Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members, continued
The Senate (Madison)The Senate, continued (Madison)The Powers of the Senate (Jay)The Powers of the Senate, continued (Hamilton)Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered (Hamilton)The Executive Department (Hamilton)The Mode of Electing the President (Hamilton)The Real Character of the Executive (Hamilton)The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)The Duration in Office of the Executive (Hamilton)The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power (Hamilton)The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive (Hamilton)The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive (Hamilton)The Appointing Power of the Executive (Hamilton)The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)The Judiciary Department (Hamilton)The Judiciary, continued (Hamilton)The Powers of the Judiciary (Hamilton)The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority (Hamilton)The Judiciary, continued (Hamilton)The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury (Hamilton)Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered (Hamilton)Concluding Remarks (Hamilton)